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   Cost of Capital Changes, the Quality of Trading Information and Market 
Architecture             
                                                                ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we examine whether there are cost of capital changes for stocks that migrate 
from a dealer to an auction trading system. We are motivated to undertake this research since 
there is a link between information quality and the architecture of a trading system. 
Moreover, recent research, such as that by Lambert et al (2007) suggests a connection 
between the quality of information and the cost of capital which suggests there may be a link 
between the trading system and the cost of capital.  An opportunity to observe whether a 
change to the trading system influences the cost of capital presented itself in 2003, when 
stocks began to migrate away from SEAQ, the more opaque trading system, onto the more 
transparent SETSmm trading system. We use the Fama-French and implied cost of capital 
models to show that the cost of capital fell for firms migrating from the dealer market SEAQ 
to the hybrid auction system SETSmm. We estimate that the average change in Fama-French 
market beta equates to a reduction in the cost of capital of about 0.6%.  
 
JEL classification: G15 
Key words: cost of capital, information quality, trading system,  
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 Cost of Capital Changes, the Quality of Trading Information and Market 
Architecture1 
1. Introduction 
On November 3, 2003, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) introduced SETSmm, a hybrid 
trading system, which replaced the dealer system called SEAQ. SETSmm offered auction 
trading for smaller, less liquid securities, for the first time. However, the system also allowed 
designated market-makers to participate to ensure liquidity could be maintained at all times.  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether the improvement in trading information, 
stemming from the adoption of a new trading system, influences the cost of capital. This is an 
important issue for the LSE because Wurgler (2000) showed that changes to the cost of 
capital influence the payoffs from investment decisions. These changes, in turn, affect how 
investment funds are allocated. As a result, there may be a connection between policy 
decisions made by stock exchanges about market architecture and the real economy. 
Although a number of studies have examined whether changes to the trading system increase 
market liquidity, no previous study has specifically examined whether changes to a trading 
system can influence the cost of capital. 
  
We are motivated to examine this issue because a variety of papers have explored the impact 
that better quality accounting information can have on the cost of capital. Although these 
studies are important for understanding the influence that accounting information has on the 
                                                           
1
 We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this paper. The generous contribution of their time 
and comments allowed us to improve the paper considerably.  
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cost of capital, they do not consider the connection between the cost of capital and changes to 
market microstructure information. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000), Botosan (2000), Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) showed that the improved 
disclosure of accounting information led to a reduction in information asymmetry that 
decreased the cost of capital. This is confirmed empirically, as Hail and Leuz (2007) and Li 
(2010) showed that the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
by European firms led to a reduction in the cost of capital. Moreover, Hail and Leuz (2009) 
showed that when firms cross-list and improved disclosure there was a corresponding 
reduction in the cost of capital. However, when firms cross-list and do not increase their level 
of disclosure, changes to the cost of capital were not evident.  We extend this literature by 
examining how improved trading information, that is provided by a stock exchange can 
influence the cost of capital.  
 
In Easley and O’Hara (2004), a more generalised information structure is examined to that 
assumed in the studies above. In particular, Easley and O’Hara (2004) extended the 
information structure to include microstructure information such as trading information. 
They showed that the quality and quantity of both accounting and trading information 
influences the cost of capital.  In empirical work, Easley et al (2002) showed that, as 
informed trading increases, expected returns and, therefore, the cost of capital rise. As an 
example, they showed that a 10% rise in information-based trading leads to a 2.5% rise in the 
cost of capital.   
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Evidence that the quality of trading information is influenced by the trading methods of 
securities is provided by Pagano and Roell (1990), who compared price formation in a dealer 
and auction market with participating informed traders. They found that the greater 
transparency of auction markets led to higher levels of market liquidity2. Meanwhile, Biais 
(1993) argued that dealer markets are more fragmented than auction markets because any 
significant pre-trade order flow information is hidden from the market. A loss of information 
also arises because bilateral telephone discussions in dealer markets contribute to 
opaqueness. This is possible as some prices are negotiated away from the electronic trading 
system obscuring the information available to investors. Transparency, and therefore the 
quality of trading information, is also lower in a dealer market because trades can be reported 
with a delay causing relevant price and volume information to be obscured. Moreover, both 
Dutta and Madhavan (1997) and Huang and Stoll (1996) demonstrated that, in a dealer 
market, bid-ask spreads fail to reach competitive levels, this drives a wedge between intrinsic 
prices and traded prices, reducing the quality of price information. In their experimental 
study, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) showed that trade disclosure increases transparency, 
price efficiency and price informativeness, demonstrating that market architecture has a 
strong impact on the quality of trading-related information.   
 
The quality of trading information is also influenced by market structure in other ways. 
Madhavan (1992) showed that information aggregation, and therefore efficiency, is higher in 
a call auction because traders with private information are forced to compete with each other. 
                                                           
2
 Gietzmann and Raonic (2014) furthered this point by showing that a change in the trading system can also 
lead to an increase in the amount of financial information that is disclosed. They asserted that firms migrating to 
SETSmm reduce information asymmetry by providing increased firm-level financial disclosure.  
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Such competition erodes information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders. 
Pagano and Schwartz (2003) showed that the use of call auctions raises the synchronicity of 
prices, indicating that information from call auctions is of a higher quality. Nimalendran and 
Petrella (2003) examined the performance of thinly-traded stocks on the Italian Bourse and 
found that market liquidity is higher in hybrid markets that combine order-driven trading 
with market maker participation. Crucially, however, the aforementioned studies stopped 
short of examining whether there was a corresponding change in the cost of capital.  
 
We use the framework of a before-and-after-event study in the same way as Christie and 
Huang (1994) or Bennet and Wei (2006), who examined the transfer of securities from one 
exchange to another. To capture possible changes in systematic risk caused by changes in 
information quality, we estimate risk using the framework of the three factor Fama-French 
(1993) model, which we augment with an illiquidity factor.  
 
Specifically, we show that, following the introduction of SETSmm, there is a short term 
increase in stock returns for migrating firms and a corresponding increase in a range of 
information quality metrics. Using Fama-French risk coefficients in the pre and post-
migration period, we have found that for migrating stocks there is a fall in market risk in the 
period following migration. Based on average costs of equity capital across UK companies, 
our results suggest that, on average, the market beta changes we identify lead to a reduction 
in the cost of equity capital of about 0.6%.  
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As a robustness check, we also calculate the cost of capital in years preceding and following 
the change in the trading system using the implied cost of capital model introduced by 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) as well as the model proposed by Easton (2004). These 
measures of risk also show that the cost of capital following migration declines for migrating 
companies.  
 
Control securities not migrating to SETSmm do not experience a fall in the cost of capital. 
We also find that our results are robust even after controlling for a range of factors that are 
commonly believed to influence the cost of capital. We examine small and large firms 
separately since smaller, less liquid stocks may behave differently to large firms as they are 
characterized by greater information asymmetry. These differences may cause diverse 
reactions to information asymmetry when the trading system alters. We find that small firms 
experience the largest reduction to risk after SETSmm is introduced.  
 
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology we 
used. Section 3 discusses the link between information and the cost of capital. Section 4 sets 
out the data, Section 5 presents the main results, Section 6 presents some robustness tests. 
Finally, Section 7 provides a summary and a conclusion to the paper.  
2: Empirical Methodology. 
 
The focus of our empirical work is to discover whether information quality improved after 
SETSmm was introduced and whether this led to changes in the cost of capital. In the first 
instance we examine whether information quality improved after SETSmm is introduced. For 
the two years preceding and following the introduction of SETSmm, we estimate the market 
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efficiency coefficient (MEC) introduced by Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) which is one of 
the most commonly used measures of information quality. The MEC is calculated as the ratio 
of the variance of two-day returns  (VAR R2 DAY ) to two times the variance of one-day 
returns ( 2 (VAR R1DAY)) as follows: 
                                       )(2 1
2
DAYRVAR
DAYRVAR
MEC = .                                              (1) 
When returns are formed in a frictionless market, the MEC is unity indicating an absence of 
intervailing effects on the return variance. A MEC greater than unity implies positive serial 
correlation due to the sequential dissemination of information, momentum trading and 
undershooting in price discovery.  
 
We also examine the responsiveness of stock returns to fluctuations in the market portfolio 
return, a metric introduced by Chordia and Swaminathan (2000). This statistic is denoted as 
DELAY and can be calculated as follows: 
                     
x
e
DELAY
−+
=
1
1
   where ti
k
ktiX ,
5
1
,
/ ββ∑
=
−
= .                                       (2) 
Where ti,β is the beta parameter estimate for the ith security, obtained from a Dimson (1979) 
aggregate coefficient regression model, based on contemporaneous and market returns 
lagged five periods. If there are no market frictions affecting security returns, the DELAY 
statistic should equal 0.5. Larger deviations from 0.5 indicate greater market frictions and 
larger price distortions.  
 
Black (1986) introduced the concept of noisy price adjustment, where frictions cause 
temporary price movements, which result in prices moving away from their intrinsic values, 
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causing short-run changes in return. As shown by Amihud and Mendelson (1987), temporary 
price movements that are quickly reversed will introduce negative serial correlation into short 
horizon returns, while slow information diffusion, momentum and slow price discovery will 
lead to positive serial correlation. To measure the effect of temporary price movements on 
returns, we estimate the one-period daily serial correlation coefficient of stock returns, used 
previously to capture price efficiency by Bennett and Wei (2006). If market quality improves 
after migration, the serial correlation coefficient should move closer to zero after the 
introduction of SETSmm. 
 
Our final measure of market quality is based on the average number of zero volume days as 
proposed by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) and Liu (2006). This metric captures the 
loss of information that arises when securities fail to trade. As shown by the non-trading 
model of Lo and MacKinlay (1990), when a security fails to trade, important information 
about the true intrinsic process is hidden from the market. This happens because, in the 
absence of a trade, the new intrinsic price is unobservable. Moreover, as suggested by 
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), thin trading can be a symptom of information 
scarcity, which deters investors from trading. The idea is that information changes investor 
expectations about price, and so provides opportunities to trade. If a new trading system 
reduces the frequency of zero volume days, then information quality improves, as more 
information about the return-generating process is relayed to the market. Higher trading 
activity in itself indicates increased information availability, thus incentivising investors to 
trade. We therefore calculate the mean number of zero volume days and consecutive zero 
volume days in the period before and after the introduction of SETSmm. 
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Next, we use the framework of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model to measure 
changes in systematic risk that arise between the pre and post-SETSmm periods. Recent 
evidence provided by Amihud (2002), Asparouhova et al (2010) and Hasbrouck (2010) 
strongly supports illiquidity risk as a priced risk characteristic. Moreover, as Amihud et al 
(1997) has shown trading systems influence illiquidity. We therefore augment the three-
factor model with an illiquidity factor computed from the illiquidity ratio of the underlying 
firms.  
 
We denote month t* as the effective month of migration. For each firm migrating to the 
hybrid SETSmm trading system, the following monthly asset pricing regression is estimated 
for months -36 to +36 of the new system. This is a procedure similar to that used previously 
by Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) to discover whether systematic risk changes 
in response to variations in dividend, by Lambert et al (2007) to show that better accounting 
information reduces the cost of capital and by Li (2010) to show that the adoption of IFRS 
reduced the cost of capital. 
ttitiftmttiftmtitiiftit SMBDsSMBsrrDbrrbDrr ∆∆∆ ++−+−++=− )()(αα  
                               itttitittiti eILLIQDlILLIQlHMLDhHMLh +++++ ∆∆ .                  (3) 
 
Where Dt is a dummy variable that has a value of zero in the pre-change period but has a 
value of unity in the post-change period, rit is the monthly stock return for firm i, rmt is the 
monthly return to the value weighted FTSE All Share index, and rft is the monthly return to a 
1-month UK T-bill. The )( ftmt rr −  is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference 
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between the return to a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy 
for small firm risk. HML is the difference between the returns to a portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks designed by Fama and French 
(1993) to capture the distressed stock effect. ILLIQ is the difference between the returns on a 
portfolio of high illiquidity stocks and a portfolio of low illiquidity stocks.  
 
The bi, si, hi and li coefficients are the factor loadings, or betas, of firm i, bi  is with respect to 
(rmt-rft),  si with respect to SMB, hi for HML and li for  ILLIQ. They therefore capture the 
firm’s systematic risk during the dealer market period.  The coefficients b∆i, s∆i ,h∆i and l∆i 
capture changes to these factor loadings, or risks, in the post-migration period. The αi is the 
risk-adjusted abnormal return or alpha of firm i during the period of dealer market trading, 
while α∆i is the change in abnormal return after migration to the hybrid trading system.  
 
As a robustness check, we also estimate the implied cost of capital in the years preceding and 
following migration using two widely employed implied cost of capital measures3. In each of 
these models, we substitute market price and earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S into the 
equation and back out the cost of capital. This is the internal rate of return that equates the 
current stock price to the expected stream of abnormal earnings. Both models are consistent 
with the dividend valuation model but make different assumptions that will influence 
estimates of the cost of capital. The first model presented below applies the growth 
assumptions of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). In their exposition of share price value 
detailed in equation (4) p354, the share price comprises the capitalised value of current 
                                                           
3
 We also apply the Claus and Thomas (2001) model and the Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) model. 
For brevity we do not report these but can confirm they show broadly similar results although cost of capital 
estimates vary.  
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earnings per share (eps) and the discounted value of future abnormal earnings per share 
growth. Their theoretical exposition allows the short-run and long-term growth rates of eps to 
diverge. Their short-run growth rate decays asymptotically at a fixed rate towards the long-
run rate as t →∞. Instead of assuming short-term growth is (eps2-eps1)/eps1, the model 
assumes a short-term growth rate of eps2-eps1-r (eps1-dps1), so that abnormal earnings growth 
is defined as the change in earnings in excess of the return achieved on net reinvestment4. 
Short-term growth, therefore, has an adjustment for foregone earnings due to expected 
dividends paid at the end of the year 1 financial year (Proposition 1, Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005)). This makes the short-term growth rate as shown in Section 6 of Ohlson 
Juettner-Nauroth p361 (eps2-eps1)/eps1)+r(dps1/eps1) rather than (eps2-eps1/eps1)5 which is 
the long-term growth rate. These assumptions lead to their implied cost of capital formulation 
as shown by their adjusted equation (9) found on p359.  
 
We employ the estimation process of Hail and Leuz (2009, p450) and extract the implied cost 
of capital (riOJ) for firm i from a pricing equation based on the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005) model. The Hail and Leuz (2009) estimation equation is shown below.    
)/()/.).(/( 111 iltiOJiltititiOJistiOJitit grgxdrgrxP −−+= +++                                    (4) 
Pit is the current share price (Po) of firm i6. Following Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Hail 
and Leuz (2009), we use one-year-ahead forecasted consensus I/B/E/S earnings forecasts xit+1 
and dividends dit+1 per share for each security, in addition to forecasts of short- and long-term 
abnormal earnings growth (gist and gilt respectively). The growth rate gist (proxying for short-
                                                           
4
 If dps1=eps1, then the abnormal change in earnings is simply eps2-eps1.   
5
 As a result, the short-term growth rate is the long-term growth rate less r(dpst/epst). 
6
 Stock prices and analyst forecasts are measured in month seven of the fiscal year to ensure that all financial 
data used is publically available and reflected in prices at the time we compute the cost of capital estimates.  
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term growth in the original formula of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005)) is estimated, 
following Gode and Mohanram (2003), as the average of the forecasted percentage change in 
earnings between year t+1 to t+2 and the five year growth forecast provided by I/B/E/S. 
Estimated dividends are set to a constant fraction of forecasted earnings based on the average 
payout ratio over the previous three years. The model requires that there is a positive change 
in forecasted earnings to provide a numerical solution7. The long-term earnings growth rate is 
gilt.  Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005 p361), assumes that growth in abnormal earnings per 
share beyond t+1 is sustainable. In the estimated model, therefore, the long-term growth rate 
is set equal to the expected rate of inflation, which provides a lower bound to estimates of the 
cost of capital8. Expectations of inflation are based on the median value of monthly one-year-
ahead realized monthly inflation rates. Our backed-out estimates of the cost of capital for 
firm i is denoted as riOJ. 
 
We also estimate the modified price-earnings growth (PEG) ratio model introduced by 
Easton (2004). The implied cost of capital from this model is a special case of the abnormal 
earnings growth valuation model developed by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). The 
model uses one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead earnings per share forecasts for firm i, along 
with expected dividends per share one year ahead for firm i in order to derive a measure of 
abnormal earnings growth. Dividends are set to a constant fraction of the firms forecasted 
                                                           
7
 If forecasts are negative, then we replace the long-run rate with the historical inflation rate estimated over the 
previous three years.   
8
 We apply an i subscript because each firm migrates to SETSmm on a different date, so a uniform inflation rate 
is not applied to each stock.  
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earnings as suggested earlier. Growth in abnormal earnings is assumed to persist in 
perpetuity after the first year.9 The model we calculate is shown below. 
                iPEGittiiPEGitit rxdrxP
2
112 /).( +++ −+= .                                                 (5) 
In this model, xit+ ᴛ is the I/B/E/S/ expected future earnings per share of firm i, riPEG is the 
implied cost of capital of firm i, calculated as the internal rate of return from solving the 
valuation model10, dit+1 is the expected future net dividends per share of firm i derived as the 
dividend payout ratio multiplied by the earnings per share. These implied cost of capital 
estimates are obtained on a firm by firm basis. Both of these models have been used 
previously by Hail and Leuz (2009) to show that a cross-listing on another exchange leads to 
a reduction in the cost of capital. A detailed discussion of equation (4) and (5) is provided in 
Hail and Leuz (2009, p450). 
 
3. Information and Systematic Risk 
 
The pioneering work of Lambert et al (2007) highlighted two ways in which the quality of 
accounting information can influence a firm’s cost of capital. Although improvements in 
accounting disclosure cannot alter the realised cash flows of firms, they can change the 
precision of expectations that investors hold regarding the distribution of cash flows. They 
showed that the covariance between the cash flows of different firms depends on the 
precision of a given firms’s information. They concluded, therefore, that an improvement to 
                                                           
9
 The model requires positive changes in forecasted earnings to yield a numerical solution.   
10
 As is usual and exemplified by Hail and Leuz (2007, 2009), we estimate the implied cost of capital iteratively 
until we identify a rate that causes prices to be within 0.001 of its actual value.  
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disclosure that reduces the measurement error of future cash flows will lead to a reduction in 
covariance and consequently the cost of capital. An effect that is not diversifiable11.  
 
Lambert et al (2007) also demonstrated that “if better information reduces the amount of firm 
cash flow that managers appropriate for themselves, the improvements in disclosure not only 
increase firm price, but in general also reduce a firm’s cost of capital” (p388). This indirect 
effect is possible because the ratio of expected cash flows to covariance shifts12. Moreover, 
they also showed that information quality can influence real investment decisions. As a 
result, the ratio of expected cash flows to non-diversifiable covariance risk changes, which in 
turn influences the cost of capital.  
 
Within the Lambert et al (2007) model, investors hold homogeneous beliefs, so no traders 
can be better informed than any other. If this assumption is relaxed, as in Hail and Leuz 
(2007), poor corporate disclosure can lead to the exploitation of uninformed traders. The 
informed, who have access to information that is not publicly available have an advantageous 
position. As a result, uninformed traders alter the prices at which they are willing to trade to 
protect themselves from unprofitable trades with the informed (reducing the price of their 
buy orders and raising the price of their sell orders). This affects the cost of capital, as 
investors expect compensation for their inferior asset allocation decisions, made as a result of 
the information asymmetry. Using a framework which allows for both informed and 
uninformed traders, Lambert et al (2011) demonstrated that it is not information asymmetry 
                                                           
11
 An improvement in disclosure also reduces variance because the precision of expectations increases, but this 
effect is asymptotically zero as the number of firms and investors increases. 
12
 When increased disclosure only affects the proportion of the firm’s cash flows that management appropriates, 
the ratio of the cash flow to covariance is unaffected. Moreover, even when the ratio is not invariant, these 
effects can be diversified.   
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per se that leads to a higher cost of capital, but rather the level of uncertainty caused by poor 
information quality. However, Armstrong et al (2011) showed that when markets are not 
fully competitive, information asymmetry re-emerges to impact the cost of capital.  
 
O’Hara (2003), Easley and O’Hara (2004) and Hughes et al (2007) consider a more general 
information set that is not restricted to accounting information but also includes trading 
information. They argue that less informed investors recognise that they are at a 
disadvantage. Consequently, these investors hold fewer assets, driving down the prices of 
securities with high information asymmetry. The result is a reduction in the cost of capital to 
compensate for these costs. This suggests that trading information such as published prices, 
volume and the speed that trading information is presented to the market can also influence 
the amount of information asymmetry and the precision of information.  
 
What all these studies cumulatively indicate is that improved information disclosure 
increases the element of return variation resulting from firm-specific information, (see for 
example Roll (1988)). A consequence of firm-specific information, becoming more 
important, is that the covariance between one firm and another decreases. This leads to a 
reduction in the covariance between a stock and the market. As a result market risk declines.  
 
When a trading system changes and the quality of trading information improves, there is less 
uncertainty about current firm values. This allows investors to differentiate more effectively 
between firms, facilitating better asset allocation decisions. The move from SEAQ to 
SETSmm improves the quality of trading information. As previously noted, prices on the 
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dealer system SEAQ are less transparent than those on SETSmm, as a high proportion of 
trades take place after telephone negotiations in dealer markets. This prevents other traders 
from knowing about the trade until after it has been reported. This, in turn, prevents investors 
from tracing out the demand and supply curves of each stock prior to a transaction. Board 
and Sutcliffe (1996) showed that over half of all SEAQ trades took place through telephone 
negotiation, which implied considerable opaqueness. In contrast, auction systems like 
SETSmm allow investors to view the most competitive buy and sell orders. This helps them 
to determine the buying and selling intensity at each price so that the demand and supply 
curves for each stock can be identified. 
   
Another feature of SEAQ which reduces the amount of trading information disclosed to the 
market concerns reporting delays. SEAQ allows trade reporting delays of up to five days for 
large trades, which means that other market participants are not informed that a trade has 
taken place or at what price until the reporting delay has elapsed. In contrast, all auction 
trades are reported immediately on SETSmm13. During a reporting delay informed traders are 
able to maintain an information advantage over the uninformed until information about the 
trade is published. This contributes to elevated levels of information asymmetry which 
investors expect to be compensated for via the cost of capital. 
 
The change to a more effective trading mechanism such as SETSmm can also increase the 
level of competition within a market by encouraging greater competition between traders. An 
                                                           
13
 Trades made through designated market makers on SETSmm are governed by special publication rules and 
are less opaque than on SETSmm. Transactions of 4 x NMS (Normal Market Size) need not be reported until 
either 80% of the trade is offset or the end of the trading day arrives, whichever is first. Trades larger than 75 x 
NMS have an extended publication delay of three days or 90% of the trade. NMS is approximately the median 
size trade.  
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increase in competition reduces the impact of information asymmetry on the cost of capital, 
as suggested by Armstrong et al (2011). Changes to the trading system that reduce non-
trading will also lead to an improvement in the quality of information and reduced 
uncertainty. 
  
Cost of capital adjustments will be observable through changes in market risk because better 
quality information increases the role of firm-specific news as the precision of information 
increases. As these changes take place, the covariances between firms decrease, causing a 
reduction in the covariance between a particular firm and the market. We therefore expect to 
observe that changes to the trading system that improve the quality of information should 
lead to a reduction in market risk. We do not envisage there being changes to the SMB or 
HML components, as these premiums reflect a firm size and a distressed firm component that 
should not be influenced by changes in the information structure. Improvements to 
information quality will also lead to improvements in market liquidity if the former are 
widespread. However, we do not envisage that market illiquidity will be impacted by a 
change in information quality after the introduction of SETSmm, as these changes only 
influence a specific segment of the market. 
 
4: Data and Summary Information  
 
 
The first stocks to migrate to SETSmm in 2003 were smaller FTSE 250 stocks that did not 
trade on SETS, the main LSE auction system. In July 2005, a further tranche of mid-cap 
stocks migrated to SETSmm, and in December 2005 a group of small companies (the 
components of the AIM 50 index-rising smaller companies) were also transferred. A 
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distinguishing feature of AIM stocks is that they are not listed on the main market and 
therefore have lower reporting obligations than FTSE 250 securities14. In addition to these 
migrations, the LSE announces via its quarterly review the names of any new securities due 
to transfer to SETSmm15.  
 
Our sample consists of all the stocks transferred from SEAQ to SETSmm between November 
3, 2003 and June 11, 2008. We then use data from three years preceding and three years 
following migration to make cost of capital estimates. This means, for estimation purposes, 
in total we use data from November 3, 2000 to June 12, 2011.  During this period, SEAQ 
stocks were transferred in 18 batches, of which 14 represented quarterly adjustments. The 
other four reflected policy decisions made by the exchange to extend auction trading to a 
wider class of securities16. Each of these transfer days is considered an event day. 
Information about the securities transferred, the announcement dates and the subsequent 
transfer dates were obtained from the London Stock Exchange. Table 1 contains a list of 
announcement and effective dates associated with each group of migrations. In total, we have 
a sample of 365 migrating securities. Daily closing security prices, closing values of the 
FTSE All Share Index and the t-bill rate used in the empirical work are obtained from 
Datastream. 
 
                                                           
14
 AIM stocks, unlike main market stocks, are subject to a nominated advisor regime rather than an FCA 
sponsor regime as they are exchange regulated securities, not EU regulated securities. Unlike main market 
companies which have to provide financial accounts for at least three years, AIM stocks do not have to provide 
a minimum financial history.  
15
 A security becomes eligible for trading on SETSmm only if its liquidity has been proven sufficient to warrant 
migration to SETSmm. Only a small number of firms migrated from SEAQ to SETSmm in this way, and during 
some quarterly reviews no migrations were announced. Since the LSE became Mifid compliant, SETSmm 
became a segment of SETS, the main trading system.  
16
 In November 2007, stocks were still traded on SETSmm, but the system was renamed SETS. Consequently, 
the last two batches were transfers from SEAQ to the SETSmm segment of SETS.  
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The SMB and HML factors have been obtained from the website of Alan Gregory at The 
University of Exeter. They are comparable to the SMB and HML factors made available on 
the website of Kenneth French for US companies. The Gregory SMB and HML factors have 
been widely used in the context of UK asset pricing models, see for example Grout and 
Zalewska (2006),  Gregory and Michou (2009) or  Gregory, Tharyan and Christidis (2009). 
 
ILLIQ is an illiquidity factor that aims to capture how illiquidity differences influence return 
performance. For each stock we construct the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio by calculating 
the previous year’s annual average of the daily absolute return to volume ratio. This value is 
multiplied by 106 and scaled by the market ratio. Days of zero volume are excluded when 
calculating the illiquidity ratio. In common with Amihud (2002) and later applications using 
the illiquidity ratio, the sample excludes stocks from any year which does not provide return 
or volume data for at least 200 of its days. We divide the sample into three groups based on 
this illiquidity ratio (high, medium and low). We then create a monthly illiquidity, mimicking 
factor ILLIQ as the average return on the high illiquidity portfolio, minus the average return 
on the low illiquidity portfolio.  
 
5: Results 
 
In Table 2 we report mean, median and standard deviation summary information for the 
stocks in our sample. Return, rm-rf, SMB and HML are the monthly stock returns, the 
monthly market risk premiums and the SMB and HML return premiums, respectively. MV is 
the market value in 000’s. M/B is the market-to-book ratio. Leverage is the ratio of debt to 
equity. Asset Growth is the change in asset values that take place between one year and 
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another and captures the growth rate of the firm. ROA is the return on assets, Div Payout is 
the ratio of dividends to earnings and Volatility is the monthly return volatility of the stock. 
Price is the average price used in the implied cost of capital models. EPS Yr1 and EPS Yr2 
are the I/B/E/S forecasts of future earnings used to obtain the implied cost of capital 
estimates. The value gs is the short-term growth rate used in the implied cost of capital 
models, glOJ is the long-term growth rate used in the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth model 
(expected inflation rate)  and glE  is the long-term growth rate used in the Easton model 
(based on the Yr 1 growth rate).  
 
In Table 3, we report five and ten-day cumulative abnormal returns following the migration 
announcement. Additionally, we report pre- and post-SETSmm values for average volume, 
market adjusted volume17 and the illiquidity ratio. These have been calculated using the 
periods 36 to 12 months preceding the event period and 12 to 36 months following the event 
period. Both the five- and ten-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR 5 and CAR 10 in Table 
3) indicate an increase in returns after the announcement that securities are to migrate to 
SETSmm. An increase in short-term returns at the time of the announcement is consistent 
with a fall in the cost of capital18. We also find that volume and market-adjusted volume rise 
in the period following the introduction of SETSmm. This is reflected in a reduction of the 
average illiquidity ratio from 0.375 prior to the introduction of SETSmm to 0.136 afterwards.  
 
5.1 Information Quality Changes 
                                                           
17We market-adjust volume by subtracting average FTSE 100 security volume.   
18
 An unexpected fall in the cost of capital leads to a rise in the share price, as future investor cash flows are 
deflated by a smaller discount rate. For the current share price to equal a set of discounted cash flows that are 
larger (due to the fall in the discount rate), the current share price must rise. The effect of this increase in the 
share price will lead to an increase in returns until the process of adjustment has been completed.   
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Next, in Table 4, we indicate that information quality has improved in the post SETSmm 
period by showing that the measures of information quality presented in Section 2, i.e. MEC, 
DELAY, autocorrelation and zero volume days all declined in the post-SETSmm period. The 
mean MEC value fell from 1.2237 to 1.0757, a change of over 12%. The mean DELAY 
coefficient fell from 0.7392 to 0.6270, a reduction of over 15%. The mean serial correlation 
coefficient changed from 0.1395, to -0.0330, indicative of positive serial correlation in the 
pre-SETSmm period but suggestive of slight return reversal in the post-SETSmm period. The 
number of zero volume days fell from about 40% (0.4028) to only 23% (0.2313) of trading 
days (a reduction of about 43%). Meanwhile, the incidence of two consecutive zero volume 
days fell from 23% to 15.5%.  
 
Motivated by the increase in abnormal returns in the post-SETSmm period and the discovery 
that the quality of trading information improved, we next examine whether the cost of capital 
decreased in the post-SETSmm period. The results from the estimation of the Fama-French 
(1993) three factor model, augmented with an illiquidity factor, are presented in Panel A of 
Table 5. This model is estimated over the 36-month period before and after migration and is 
therefore estimated over different calendar dates for the sample stocks. This allows us to 
isolate the impact of changes in risk, due to an alteration in the trading system, separately 
from the changes that arise due to the time period being studied.  
 
5.2 Cost of Capital Changes 
The α from the Fama-French model indicates that in the pre-SETSmm period, migrating 
firms earn positive abnormal returns. However, in the post-SETSmm period, migrating 
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securities earn negative abnormal returns, as α∆ is negative and larger than α. The estimated 
pre-SETSmm market beta from the Fama-French model indicates that the mean pre-
SETSmm market beta, SMB, HML and illiquidity beta are 0.9583, 0.9295, 0.0453 and 
0.0470, respectively. In the post-SETSmm period, there is a significant reduction in market 
risk for migrating firms as the average beta falls by -0.1108, reducing the post-migration 
average beta to 0.8475. In the post-SETSmm period, the average value of the SMB beta falls 
by 0.3249. Neither the HML or the illiquidity beta changes significantly in the post-SETSmm 
period. Over this period, the average market risk premium was estimated to be about 5%, so 
a reduction in market risk of this magnitude results in a reduction in the cost of capital 
equivalent on average to about 0.6%. 
 
The implied cost of capital estimates from the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and the Easton 
(2005) model are presented in panel B and C of Table 5, respectively. Panel B shows that the 
average Juettner-Nauroth implied cost of capital estimate is 13.89% at three years, 16.51% at 
two years and 13.69% at one year prior to migration, respectively. During the year of 
migration, the average cost of capital is 13.17%. In the year following migration, the average 
cost of capital falls to 11.97% and remains below Yr 0 levels three years after migration. As 
a check on the above, we also estimate the same implied cost of capital models using only 
stocks that provide cost of capital estimates in Yr 1, 0 and Yr -1. We then measure the 
change in implied cost of capital estimates for estimated pairs. The average change in the 
implied cost of capital between year 0 and +1 is -0.0096. The average difference between Yr 
-1 and Yr 1 is -0.0116. Both changes are statistically significant and indicate a reduction in 
the average implied cost of capital.  
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Panel C, which contains the Easton implied cost of capital estimates, presents results 
consistent with those of Panel B, although precise estimates of the implied cost of capital 
each year are not identical. Average Easton implied cost of capital estimates are lower prior 
to migration to SETSmm compared to Juettner-Nauroth estimates. However, implied cost of 
capital estimates decline and remain lower than prior-to-migration estimates in all years 
following migration, as was the case for Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth estimates19. Our analysis of 
paired differences shows that, on average, the change in implied cost of capital is -0.0138 
between Yr 0 and Yr 1. Between Yr -1 and Yr 1, the implied cost of capital falls by 0.0078. 
Across all SETSmm firms, the correlation coefficient between the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth 
and the Easton cost of capital measures is 0.973.  
 
5.3. Firm Size 
 
An important consideration when altering the trading system is the effect that these changes 
can have on the performance of different classes of securities. This was highlighted by 
Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) and Nimalendran and Petrella (2003), who showed that 
when a trading system changes, the benefits of such a change may be dependent on firm 
liquidity. Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) showed that in the case of the Paris Bourse 
migration of securities from a call auction to a continuous auction system, led to a rise in 
value of liquid firms but also a fall in value for illiquid firms. Easley et al (1996) have also 
argued that smaller stocks are characterized by greater informational asymmetries.  
                                                           
19
 Our estimates are likely to be different, as the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth model assumes that long-term growth 
is equal to the expected inflation rate, while Easton assumes that long-term growth in abnormal earnings is 
based on the relevant year 1 growth rates. Differences in the way long-term growth rates are derived are likely 
to lead to differences in the implied cost of capital estimates.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 24
In Table 6 we report the Fama-French model estimated separately for migrating small, 
medium and large firms, and in Table 7 we report implied cost of capital estimates for the 
three groups based on firm size. Table 6 shows that in the pre-SETSmm period, the mean 
beta of all size groupings is significant and positive. Small firms have the largest market beta 
(1.0224) and the smallest beta is associated with medium firms (0.9137). The largest changes 
in beta are associated with small firms as their average change in beta is -0.1554. The 
medium-sized firms do not experience a significant reduction in market beta, while for large 
firms the average beta falls by 0.1072 (only significant at a 10% level). This suggests that 
small firms benefited most from a reduction in market risk as a result of changes to the 
trading system. The average market risk premium to firms during this period is about 5%, so 
a reduction in beta of this magnitude equates to a decline in the cost of capital of about 
0.78% for small firms. 
 
Table 7 also shows that the risk of firms is related to their size. In both the Juettner-Nauroth 
and Easton models, we find that the magnitude of risk estimates are related to firm size. 
Firms in the small firm group have the largest implied cost of capital estimates and large 
firms tend to have the smallest. We also find that the estimated changes in risk are greatest 
for small firms. When applying the Juettner-Nauroth model, the implied cost of capital of 
small firms falls by 0.23 when measured between Yr 1 and Yr 0 and by 0.038 when 
measured between Yr +1 and Yr -1. Changes associated with medium and large firms are 
insignificant. The results suggested by the Easton model are similar, although estimated 
changes to the implied cost of capital are slightly smaller.   
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6: Robustness Tests 
 
6.1 Control stocks 
As a first robustness test, we take a sample of non-migrating securities from those stocks on 
SEAQ that were never transferred to SETSmm20. For these stocks we should observe no 
change in the cost of capital because trading information for these stocks did not improve. 
Using these control stocks, we estimate the information quality measures presented in Table 
4 and find no indication that information quality improved in the post-SETSmm period 
(unreported). Results from the estimation of the Fama-French model are presented in Table 8 
and show that there are no obvious changes to risk estimates in the post-SETSmm period21.  
 
6.2 Other factors influencing cost of capital changes 
The cost of capital of a firm can change for reasons unrelated to the quality of information. 
To demonstrate more fully that our results are not driven by unrelated influences on the cost 
of capital, we estimate the following regression model: the dependent variable CC is the cost 
of capital and is either the beta from the Fama-French model or the implied cost of capital 
from the Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth model or the Easton model. For each security, we obtain 
estimates using the period three years prior and subsequent to SETSmm migration. For each 
stock there are, therefore, seven observations, despite the fact that the calendar years will be 
different across stocks because migration to SETSmm occurred at different times. The 
Difference-in-Difference model we estimate is described below. 
 
                                                           
20
 We match to each security on SETSmm a security that is on SEAQ. To make an appropriate match we choose 
a SEAQ security that is from the same industry and most similar in size.  
21
 We do notice that, as for the migrating sample, the SMB beta does fall in the post-SETSmm period. This 
suggests that the fall in the SMB that we observed for migrating stocks is not due to the introduction of 
SETSmm.  
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SETSmm is a dummy variable that takes a value of 0 if firms are control securities but has a 
value of unity if stocks are SETSmm stocks. The coefficient associated with this variable will 
determine whether migrating stocks have a higher or lower cost of capital to control stocks. 
Time is a dummy variable that has a value of 0 if the cost of capital measure is estimated 
prior to the stock moving to SETSmm, but has a value of unity otherwise22. This indicates 
whether the cost of capital across all stocks is higher or lower in the post-SETSmm period. 
SETSmm*Time has a value of 0, but if the stock migrates to SETSmm and is observed in the 
post-SETSmm period, it has a value of unity. This is the key variable as it will show whether 
the cost of capital estimate is higher or lower for SETSmm stocks in the post-SETSmm 
period compared to the control firms. For our analysis to be correct, this must be negatively 
signed, indicating that SETSmm securities had a lower cost of capital in the post-SETSmm 
period. 
 
To allow other factors to influence the cost of capital we also include a range of control 
variables. The risk of a security is positively influenced by its capital structure, so we include 
a variable called Leverage which is the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. We include Asset 
Growth, which is the change in total asset values between yrt+1 and yrt to capture the growth 
strategy of the firm as this may influence its risk. We include the Return on Assets (ROA) as 
a measure of performance. To capture the influence of the firm’s payout policy on the cost of 
                                                           
22
 For control stocks this variable equals the corresponding value of its counterpart. 
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capital, we include the dividend payout (Div Payout) ratio of firms. Ret Volatility is the 
return volatility of a firm’s stock return and reflects the degree of precision investors face 
when forming expectations. We also include the market return (Market) to capture the 
current state of the economy along with the risk free return (rf). Since the industry a firm 
belongs to can also influence the cost of capital, we also include a set of 23 different industry 
dummies (IND) to capture industry influences (unreported for brevity).  
 
The results from this panel regression along with p values for each variable are presented in 
Table 9.  The results show that SETSmm stocks have a higher cost of capital than control 
stocks. In the post-SETSmm period, the cost of capital is higher. However, for stocks that 
migrate to SETSmm, the cost of capital is lower, indicating that even after we control for a 
whole range of factors that are known to influence the cost of capital, we still find that in the 
post-SETSmm period the cost of capital is lower for SETSmm securities.  
 
Overall, we have shown that a change in the trading system can be highly beneficial to firms 
that migrate. One key benefit that we are the first to highlight is that migration to an 
improved trading system can lead to a reduction in systematic risk, as liquidity and the 
informativeness of prices improves. We provide the first empirical evidence to show that the 
transmission mechanism for such changes occurs through a reduction in systematic risk, as 
initially suggested by Easley and O’Hara (2004). Moreover, we find that risk reductions 
appear to be greatest for the smallest and least liquid firms in the sample.  
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Improved information disclosure increases the element of return variation derived from firm-
specific information. Consequently, the return covariance between one firm and another 
decreases, which, in turn, reduces the covariance between a stock and the market portfolio, 
leading to an overall decline in market risk (Roll (1988)). We examine whether the cost of 
capital changed for firms after they migrated to SETSmm. Such changes are possible because 
SETSmm is an example of a more transparent trading system that improves the quality of 
trading information provided to the market. As such, it should play an important role in 
reducing information asymmetry between traders and increasing the precision of information.   
 
We find that after stocks move to SETSmm, they experience an improvement in information 
quality as shown in our estimation of a range of information quality metrics before and after 
the introduction of SETSmm. We then use the framework of the Fama-French model (1993) 
and implied cost of capital estimates from Ohlson Juettner-Narouth (2005) and Easton (2004) 
to show that the cost of capital for migrating firms fell in the three years after they migrated 
to SETSmm. We show a decline in the market risk of firms measured by market beta in the 
post-SETSmm period but no corresponding change for a group of SEAQ securities (control 
securities) that do not migrate to the new system. We find that our results are highly robust, 
given our inclusion of a regression model, which controls for other factors that may alter the 
cost of capital. Using this regression model, we find that SETSmm securities still experience 
a fall in the cost of capital in the post-SETSmm period.     
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Table 1: Sample of migrations to SETSmm 
In this table, N is the number of securities that migrate during a specified event. Event 
documents each migration of securities from SEAQ to SETSmm. Announced is the 
announcement date of a migration to SETSmm and Effective is the actual transfer date. 
Quarterly announcements that do not lead to changes are not noted.  
 
 N Announced Effective Source 
Event 189 16/6/2003 3/11/2003 LSE service announcement 36/03 
Event 8 12/12/2003 22/12/2003 LSE service announcement 67/03 
Event 7 15/03/2004 22/03/2004 LSE service announcement 05/03 
Event 8 11/06/2004 21/06/2004 LSE service announcement 30/04 
Event 8 9/09/2004 13/09/04 LSE service announcement 51/04 
Event 1 9/12/2005 12/09/2005 LSE service announcement 53/05 
Event  200 7/07/2005 11/07/05 LSE press release 
Event 60 5/09/2005 5/12/2005 LSE service announcement 47/05 
Event 100 18/10/2005 5/12/2005 LSE press release 
Event 16 8/12/2005 12/12/2005 LSE service announcement 75/05 
Event 
Event   
Event  
Event                              
7 
10  
29   
12             
10/03/2006 
9/06/2006 
12/12/2006    
8/06/2007        
14/03/2006 
13/06/2006 
12/12/2006  
12/06/2007              
LSE service announcement 08/06 
LSE service announcement 22/06 
LSE service announcement 50/06 
LSE service announcement LIVE 37/07 
Event 1 07/09/2007 12/09/2007 LSE service announcement LIVE 67/07 
Event           2 07/11/2007 11/09/2007 LSE service announcement LIVE 109/07 
Event           1            05/03/2008  06/03/2008 LSE service announcement LIVE  20/08 
Event 2 07/06/2008  11/06/2008 LSE service announcement LIVE  48/08 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
In this table we provide mean, median and standard deviation values of the variables used in 
our study. Return is the stock return, Illiquidity is the Amihud illiquidity ratio, the rm-rf is the 
excess market return, SMB and HML are the monthly returns to the SMB and HML factors. 
MV is the market capitalisation of the firm in ‘000’s, M/B is the market to book ratio, 
Leverage is the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. Asset Growth is the change in total asset 
value and ROA is the return on assets. . Div Payout is the fraction of dividends to earnings, 
volatility is the variance of monthly stock returns. Price is the published price used in the 
implied cost of capital models. EPS Yr1 and Yr2 are the I/B/E/S EPS forecasts used in the 
computation of the implied cost of capital estimates, gs is the short-term growth rate 
estimate, the glOJ and glE are long-term growth rates estimated for the Ohlson, Juettner-
Nauroth Model and the Easton model, respectively.  
 
All SETSmm Controls 
mean median s.d. Mean Median s.d. mean median s.d. 
Return 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Illiquidity 0.437 0.160 0.577 0.322 0.134 0.547 0.868 0.709 0.660 
rm_rf 0.009 0.014 0.059 0.009 0.014 0.059 0.009 0.014 0.059 
SMB 0.003 0.003 0.019 0.003 0.003 0.019 0.003 0.003 0.019 
HML 0.003 0.004 0.019 0.003 0.004 0.019 0.003 0.004 0.019 
MV 75.2 18.6 81.9 125.3 22.2 89.2 3.5 1.8 4.0 
M/B 2.9 2.2 5.9 2.9 2.3 6.1 2.5 2.2 2.2 
Leverage 0.558 0.548 0.285 0.570 0.564 0.288 0.423 0.417 0.209 
Asset Growth 0.197 0.107 0.522 0.188 0.105 0.507 0.289 0.127 0.671 
ROA 0.058 0.058 0.130 0.059 0.058 0.131 0.055 0.059 0.113 
Div Payout 15.6 34.3 26.0 38.4 36.3 25.3 4.6 2.5 6.1 
Volatility 0.020 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.017 0.011 0.030 0.031 0.015 
Price 225.9 195.5 347.2 339.9 257.5 356.4 170.9 130.0 149.5 
EPS Yr1 17.0 16.0 25.4 22.9 16.6 26.1 12.8 7.1 13.1 
EPS Yr2 20.1 19.2 27.6 26.1 19.5 28.3 14.3 8.8 14.1 
gs 0.294 0.124 1.863 0.348 0.125 1.942 0.225 0.121 0.407 
glOJ 0.020 0.023 0.004 0.020 0.023 0.004 0.022 0.023 0.003 
glE 0.03 0.03 0.015 0.03 0.03 0.015 0.03 0.03 0.015 
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Table 3: Abnormal return and liquidity following migration to SETSmm 
 
This table presents information about abnormal return and liquidity around the migration 
period. CAR 5 is the cumulative return on day 5 and CAR 10 is the cumulative abnormal 
return on day 10. Volume is the mean average daily trading volume of securities preceding 
the introduction of SETSmm (in thousands). Market Adjusted Volume is firm volume 
deflated by the average volume of the FTSE 100 securities. Illiquidity Ratio is the mean 
Amihud illiquidity ratio. Each of these variables is calculated for the pre- and post-SETSmm 
periods, respectively. Prior to SETSmm captures these values in the pre-SETSmm period and 
Post-SETSmm captures values after the introduction of SETSmm. Difference captures 
changes in these values. The t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 
 Prior to SETSmm Post-SETSmm Difference   
CAR 5  0.0171    
  (1.93)    
CAR 10  0.0281    
  (2.01)    
 
Volume 
 
796.00 
 
893.78 
 
97.78 
  
   (2.04)   
Market Adjusted Volume 0.0515 0.0578 0.063   
   (2.05)   
Illiquidity Ratio 0.375 0.136 0.239   
   (2.14)   
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                       Table 4: Market quality results 
This table reports the results from the market quality tests we employed. 
MEC is the market efficiency coefficient, DELAY captures lagged and 
contemporaneous changes between the stock return and market returns, 
Autocorrelation is the one-period serial correlation coefficient. % zero 
volume is the percentage of zero volume days present in all available trading 
days. % 2 days zero volume is the proportion of all trading days accounted 
for by two consecutive zero volume days present in all available trading 
days. Before and after are the pre- and post-SETSmm periods. % dif 
captures percentage changes to the market quality measures. Below are the 
results of the t-test and p-values. 
 
  
  
MEC DELAY Autocorrelation 
% Zero 
Volume 
% 2 days 
zero 
volume  
Before 1.2237 0.7392 0.1395 0.4028 0.2330 
After 1.0757 0.6270 -0.0330 0.2313 0.1549 
% dif  -0.1209 -0.1518 -1.2366 -0.4258 -0.3352 
t-test -5.79 -72.24 -25.39 -37.58 -20.62 
p-value (mean)  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 5: Cost of capital changes for SETSmm securities  
The )( ftmt rr −  is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small firm risk. 
HML is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a 
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ILLIQ is the return to a high illiquidity portfolio less 
the return to a low illiquidity portfolio. Coefficients b
-i,s-i, h-i and l-i are the factor loadings or 
betas of firm i, estimated using information from t-36 to t-1 of migration and therefore 
capture the systematic risk of the firm in the pre-SETSmm period. The coefficients b∆i, s∆i 
,h∆i and l∆i capture changes to risk post-SETSmm. The αi and α∆i are pre- and post-SETSmm 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Median is the median coefficient value and the p-value is the 
probability value. The implied cost of capital estimates using the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
model and the Easton (2005) model are presented in panels B and C, respectively. In panel B 
and C, yr is the year relative to the introduction of SETSmm for each security. ∆ +1,0 and 
∆+1,-1 are the cost of capital changes associated with matched securities between these 
years. The t-statistics are provided in parenthesis below. 
 
Panel A Fama-French Results 
 ab r ab r (rm-rf) (rm-rf) SMB SMB HML HML ILLIQ ILLIQ 
  α
-i α∆i b –i b∆i s –i s∆i h-i h∆i l-i l∆i 
Mean 0.0021 -0.0060 0.9583 -0.1108 0.9295 -0.3249 0.0453 0.0405 0.0470 -0.0367 
Median  0.0039 -0.0048 0.9430 -0.0907 0.8138 -0.2681 0.0469 0.0457 0.0452 0.0000 
p-value 0.0274 0.0000 0.0000 0.0117 0.0000 0.0000 0.1691 0.4724 0.2732 0.4645 
 
 
 
Panel B: Ohlson  Juettner-Nauroth Model 
 
Yr -3 Yr -2 Yr -1 Yr 0 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 ∆ +1,0 ∆ +1,-1 
Mean 0.1389    0.1651   0.1369  0.1317   0.1197   0.1213  0.1020 -0.0096 -0.0116 
Median 0.1175 0.1386 0.1143 0.1188 0.1068 0.1071 0.0955 (-2.66) (-2.36) 
Std. Dev 0.0767 0.1038 0.0859 0.0556 0.0609 0.0671 0.0449   
Min 0.0149 0.0357 0.0221 0.0160 0.0177 0.0144 0.0072   
Max 0.4588 0.7947 0.9011 0.4165 0.5687 0.5585 0.2909   
 
                                                                     
Panel C: Easton Model 
Yr -3 Yr -2 Yr -1 Yr 0 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 ∆ +1,0 ∆ +1,-1 
Mean 0.1296 0.1470 0.1221 0.1288 0.1141 0.1135 0.0994 -0.0138 -0.0078 
Median 0.1175 0.1304 0.1121 0.1190 0.1041 0.1049 0.0984 (-4.59) (-2.38) 
Std. Dev 0.0581 0.0712 0.0437 0.0474 0.0411 0.0410 0.0285   
Min 0.0041 0.0407 0.0348 0.0235 0.0264 0.0282 0.0400   
Max 0.4638 0.7802 0.3094 0.3756 0.3786 0.3837 0.2180   
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Table 6: Fama-French results by size grouping 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the Fama-French model.  
 
ttitiftmttiftmtitiiftit SMBDsSMBsrrDbrrbDrr ∆−∆−∆− ++−+−++=− )()(αα            
tttitittiti eILLIQDlILLIQlHMLDhHMLh +++++ ∆−∆−  
Dt is a dummy variable that has a value of zero in the pre-change period but has a value of 
unity in the post-change period, rit is the monthly stock return for firm i, rmt is the monthly 
return to the value-weighted FTSE All Share index, and rft is the monthly return to a one-
month UK T-bill. The )( ftmt rr −  is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between 
the return on a portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for 
small firm risk. HML is the difference between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to 
market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ILLIQ is the return to a high 
illiquidity portfolio less the return to a low illiquidity portfolio. ab r is the average abnormal 
return to securities.  Coefficients b
-i,s-i, h-i and l-i are the factor loadings, or betas, of firm i 
estimated using information from  t-36 to t-1 of migration and therefore capture the 
systematic risk of the firm during the dealer market period. The coefficients b∆i, s∆i ,h∆i and l∆i 
capture changes to risk in the post-migration period as reflected in the period t=0 to t+36 
after migration. The αi is the risk-adjusted abnormal return or alpha of firm i during the 
period of dealer market trading while α∆i is the change in abnormal return after migration to 
the hybrid trading system. 
 
                 SMALL 
 ab r  ab r (rm-rf) (rm-rf) SMB SMB HML HML ILLIQ ILLIQ 
  α
-i α∆i b –i b∆i s –i s∆i h-i h∆i l-i l∆i 
Mean -0.0028 -0.0067 1.0224 -0.1554 1.0819 -0.4938 0.1126 -0.0580 0.0135 0.0020 
Median -0.0005 -0.0044 0.9623 -0.1124 1.0121 -0.3462 0.0470 -00180 0.0339 0.0020 
p-value 0.1241 0.0028 0.0000 0.0349 0.0000 0.0000 0.1815 0.6368 0.8679 0.9833 
 
          
 MEDIUM                 
 ab r ab r  (rm-rf) (rm-rf) SMB SMB HML HML ILLIQ ILLIQ 
  α
-i α∆i b –i b∆i s –i s∆i h-i h∆i l-i l∆i 
Mean 0.0046 -0.0076 0.9137 -0.0794 0.9212 -0.3257 -0.0447 0.2134 -0.1184 0.1587 
Median 0.0063 -0.0065 0.8615 -0.0394 0.7554 -0.2933 0.0226 0.2343 -0.0211 0.1424 
p-value 0.0037 0.0006 0.0000 0.3292 0.0000 0.0001 0.4563 0.0485 0.0756 0.0432 
 
          
 LARGE                 
 ab r ab r  (rm-rf) (rm-rf) SMB SMB HML HML ILLIQ ILLIQ 
  α
-i α∆i b –i b∆i s –i s∆i h-i h∆i l-i l∆i 
Mean 0.0042 -0.0041 0.9423 -0.1072 0.7960 -0.1821 0.0640 -0.0166 0.2277 -0.2341 
Median 0.0053 -0.0035 0.9643 -0.0544 0.7799 -0.1141 0.0606 0.0504 0.1602 -0.2126 
p-value 0.0035 0.0315 0.0000 0.0946 0.0000 0.0003 0.0595 0.7889 0.0027 0.0084 
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Table 7: Implied cost of capital changes by size groups 
This table presents the implied cost of capital changes by size grouping. Panel A presents the 
results based on the implied cost of capital estimates using the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and 
Panel B presents the results based on the Easton (2005) model. ∆ =+1,0 and ∆+1,-1 are the cost of 
capital changes associated securities between these years. t statistics are provided in parenthesis 
below.  
 
Panel A: Ohlson, Juettner-Nauroth Model 
  
 
       Size 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 ∆ +1, 0 ∆ +1, -1 
           Small Mean 0.156 0.191 0.165 0.150 0.127 0.120 0.087 -0.023 -0.038 
 
Median 0.142 0.165 0.120 0.116 0.113 0.115 0.077 (-1.99) (-2.18) 
 
Std. Dev 0.064 0.072 0.052 0.045 0.046 0.036 0.036 
  
 
Min 0.034 0.098 0.072 0.065 0.054 0.034 0.059 
  
 
Max 0.307 0.360 0.298 0.315 0.283 0.243 0.231 
  
           Medium Mean 0.127 0.153 0.119 0.115 0.112 0.109 0.098 -0.003 -0.007 
 
Median 0.117 0.134 0.111 0.113 0.101 0.102 0.098 (-0.62) (-1.03) 
 
Std. Dev 0.060 0.093 0.034 0.030 0.043 0.030 0.018 
  
 
Min 0.043 0.066 0.051 0.051 0.037 0.045 0.062 
  
 
Max 0.464 0.780 0.223 0.225 0.379 0.199 0.125 
  
           Large Mean 0.114 0.118 0.110 0.106 0.105 0.103 0.094 -0.001 -0.005 
 
Median 0.111 0.119 0.108 0.103 0.103 0.100 0.097 (-0.93) (-1.41) 
 
Std. Dev 0.039 0.032 0.034 0.051 0.024 0.022 0.021 
  
 
Min 0.017 0.041 0.035 0.043 0.041 0.057 0.040 
  
 
Max 0.228 0.207 0.245 0.371 0.188 0.171 0.135 
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Panel B: Easton Model  
 
Size  
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 ∆(+1, 0) ∆(+1, -1) 
  
         Small Mean 0.164 0.195 0.154 0.143 0.125 0.120 0.191 -0.018 -0.029 
 Median 0.145 0.173 0.128 0.146 0.113 0.110 0.191 (-1.99) (-2.55) 
 Std. Dev 0.084 0.071 0.086 0.049 0.047 0.043 0.140 
  
 Min 0.052 0.096 0.071 0.043 0.040 0.043 0.092 
  
 Max 0.393 0.354 0.560 0.317 0.287 0.324 0.290 
  
  
         Medium Mean 0.139 0.169 0.131 0.118 0.128 0.125 0.091 0.010 -0.003 
 Median 0.117 0.148 0.114 0.112 0.102 0.109 0.092 (1.87) (-0.29) 
 Std. Dev 0.077 0.106 0.068 0.045 0.090 0.077 0.017 
  
 Min 0.059 0.069 0.027 0.058 0.018 0.038 0.055 
  
 Max 0.459 0.783 0.491 0.390 0.569 0.514 0.111 
  
  
         Large Mean 0.116 0.117 0.116 0.107 0.109 0.102 0.092 0.002 -0.007 
 Median 0.115 0.119 0.105 0.128 0.104 0.096 0.094 (0.42) (-1.22) 
 Std. Dev 0.043 0.035 0.052 0.050 0.037 0.035 0.025 
  
 Min 0.015 0.036 0.022 0.052 0.038 0.042 0.027 
  
 Max 0.229 0.209 0.435 0.365 0.298 0.323 0.140 
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Table 8: Cost of capital changes for control securities 
This table presents the results from estimating the Fama-French style model for a group of control 
securities. )( ftmt rr −  is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks. HML is the difference between the returns on a 
portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, ILLIQ is the 
return to a high illiquidity portfolio, less the return to a low illiquidity portfolio. Coefficients b
-i,s-i, h-i 
and l
-i are the factor loadings or betas of firm i estimated using information from t-36 to t-1 of migration 
and therefore capture the systematic risk of the firm in the pre-SETSmm period. The coefficients b∆i, s∆i 
,h∆i and l∆i capture changes to risk in the post-SETSmm period as reflected in the period t=0 to t+36 after 
migration. The αi and α∆ is the risk-adjusted abnormal return (ab r) or alpha of firm i during the two 
periods. Median is the median coefficient value and the p-value is the probability value. The implied 
cost of capital estimates using the Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model and the Easton (2005) model are 
presented in panels B and C, respectively.  In panel B and C, Yr is the year relative to the introduction of 
SETSmm for each security. ∆ =1,0 and ∆+1,-1 are the cost of capital changes associated securities 
between these years, t statistics are provided in parenthesis below.  
 
                Panel A: Fama-French Cost of Capital Estimates 
 ab r ab r  (rm-rf) (rm-rf) SMB SMB HML HML ILLIQ ILLIQ 
  α
-i α∆ b –i b∆i s –i s∆i h-i h∆i l-i l∆i 
Mean -0.0025 0.0022 1.0346 0.0023 1.2349 -0.5468 0.1829 0.0638 0.0102 0.0574 
Median -0.0190 -0.0020 0.9301 0.0283 1.1754 -0.4769 0.1080 0.1713 -0.1377 0.0941 
p-value 0.0000 0.4238 0.0000 0.9765 0.0000 0.0000 0.0229 0.5961 0.9115 0.6013 
 
 
 
Panel B: Ohlson Juettner-Nauroth Implied Cost of Capital Estimates 
 
Yr -3 Yr -2 Yr -1 Yr 0 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 
∆ +1,0 ∆ +1,-1  
Mean 0.1023 0.1043 0.0873 0.0570 0.0962 0.0776 0.0854 0.0505 0.0139  
Median 0.0860 0.1324 0.0488 0.0000 0.1052 0.0000 0.0698 (2.48) (0.42)  
Std. Dev 0.1076 0.0989 0.0966 0.0852 0.1124 0.1219 0.1342    
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000    
Max 0.4858 0.3770 0.3127 0.2558 0.5924 0.6127 0.9424    
   
                                   
Panel C: Easton Model Implied Cost of Capital Estimates 
 
Yr -3 Yr -2 Yr -1 Yr 0 Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 
∆ +1,0 ∆ +1,-1  
Mean 0.1688 0.1541 0.1636 0.1579 0.1614 0.1695 0.1481 0.0036 0.0022  
Median 0.1709 0.1551 0.1919 0.1593 0.1304 0.1357 0.1280 (0.327) (0.137)  
Std. Dev 0.0876 0.0815 0.0687 0.0626 0.1028 0.1302 0.1486    
Min 0.0793 0.0001 0.0060 0.0000 0.0060 0.1013 0.0143    
Max 0.4858 0.3770 0.3127 0.2558 0.5924 0.6127 0.9424    
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Table 9: Controlling for other factors influencing the cost of capital 
 
In this table, we provide the results from a regressing beta, or the implied cost of capital 
estimates, against a set of control variables. Each of the control variables are known to 
influence firm risk. In this regression we include a dummy variable called SETSmm, which 
has a value of 0 if firms are control securities and a value of unity if they are SETSmm 
securities. Time Dummy is a variable that has a value of zero in the three years preceding 
SETSmm and a value of unity in each of the three years following SETSmm . SETSmm*time 
Dummy has a value of 0 if firms are control securities, or are observed pre-SETSmm, but has 
a value equal to unity if firms are SETSmm firms and are observed after the introduction of 
SETSmm. Beta are the market risk estimates from the Fama-French model, O-J-N cost and 
Easton cost are the implied cost of capital estimates from the Ohlson  Juettner-Nauroth and 
Easton models, respectively.  
 
 
 
Coefficient P value Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
 
Beta 
 
O-J-N Cost 
 
Easton Cost 
 SETSmm Dummy 0.285 0.02 -0.021 0.00 0.081 0.00 
Time Dummy 0.439 0.00 0.002 0.75 0.012 0.16 
SETSmm*Time Dummy -0.395 0.00 -0.015 0.04 -0.026 0.00 
Leverage 0.163 0.01 0.014 0.00 0.000 0.96 
Asset Growth 0.057 0.09 -0.004 0.08 -0.006 0.01 
ROA -0.183 0.14 -0.040 0.00 -0.048 0.00 
Div Payout -0.002 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Ret Volatility -4.566 0.00 -0.153 0.14 -0.004 0.97 
Market Return 0.550 0.80 -0.132 0.30 -0.215 0.07 
Risk Free Rate -40.689 0.03 -4.118 0.00 -2.273 0.06 
        
 
